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Relationship lending and competition: 
Higher switching cost does not necessarily imply 
greater relationship benefits 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 3/2005 
Timo Vesala 




This paper studies relationship lending in a framework where the cost of 
switching banks measures the degree of banking competition. The relationship 
lender’s (insider bank’s) informational advantage creates a lock-in effect, which is 
at its height when the switching cost is infinitesimal. This is because a low 
switching cost gives rise to a potential adverse selection problem, and outsider 
banks are thus reluctant to make overly aggressive bids. This effect gradually 
fades as the magnitude of the switching cost increases, which de facto reduces the 
insider bank’s profits. However, after a certain threshold in the switching cost, the 
insider bank’s ‘mark-up’ begins to increase again. Hence, relationship benefits are 
a non-monotonous (V-shaped) function of the switching cost. The ‘dynamic 
implication’ of this pattern is that relationship formation should be more common 
under extreme market structures ie when the cost of switching banks is either very 
low or sufficiently high. Recent empirical evidence lends support to this 
prediction. 
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Luottosuhteet ja pankkikilpailu: Pankkiasiakkuuden 
vaihtamisen kustannukset eivät välttämättä lisää 
suhdeluototuksen kannattavuutta 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 3/2005 
Timo Vesala 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan luottosuhteiden muodostumisen ja pankkikilpailun 
välistä yhteyttä. Kilpailullisuuden mittana käytetään kustannusta, joka luotonhaki-
jalle aiheutuu asiakkuuden siirtämisestä toiseen pankkiin (ns. vaihtokustannus). 
Pankin informaatioetu omien asiakkaiden riskeistä aiheuttaa ns. lukkiutumisen, 
joka on voimakkaimmillaan, kun vaihtokustannus lähenee nollaa. Tämä johtuu 
siitä, että vähäinen vaihtokustannus lisää ulkopuolisten pankkien näkökulmasta 
haitallisen valikoitumisen ongelmaa (adverse selection) ja vähentää näin 
kilpailijapankkien halukkuutta aggressiiviseen hintakilpailuun. Haitallisen valikoi-
tumisen ongelma pienenee sitä mukaa kuin vaihtokustannus kasvaa, ja tämä 
tosiasiallisesti supistaa pankin voittoja. Vaihtokustannukselle on kuitenkin 
olemassa kynnysarvo, jota suuremmilla arvoilla haitallisen valikoitumisen 
ongelma häviää kokonaan ja pankin voittomarginaali vaihtokustannuksen suhteen 
alkaa kasvaa. Luottosuhteen tuottamien voittojen ja vaihtokustannuksen välillä on 
siten ei-monotoninen, V:n muotoinen relaatio. Mallin dynaaminen johtopäätös on, 
että luottosuhteiden muodostumisen pitäisi olla yleisintä äärimmäisten 
markkinarakenteiden oloissa eli ts. kun vaihtokustannus on hyvin pieni tai kun se 
on riittävän suuri. Viimeaikainen empiirinen tutkimus tukee tätä hypoteesia. 
 
Avainsanat: suhdeluototus, vaihtokustannus, pankkikilpailu 
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In their widely cited article Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that credit market
competition may be ‘inimical’ to the formation of lending relationships. The
intuition is that banks with monopoly power can extract future proﬁts from the
borrower, which creates an incentive to subsidize greater loan availability at
the early stages of the lending relationship.1 However, their empirical evidence
supports this hypothesis only in the case of very young ﬁrms (less than 4 years
old). Instead, for ﬁrms which are not ‘start-ups’ but not ‘old’ either, there
is a tendency for institutional debt being more common under the extreme
market structures (either most competitive or most concentrated) than under
the intermediate case. From a theoretical ground, this is surprising because
the ‘subsidize-ﬁrst-extract-rents-later’ strategy would expect to be even more
proﬁtable in the case of relatively young but already well established ﬁrms.
Those ﬁrms still possess strong growth potential but do not suﬀer from severe
risk of failure. As Cao and Shi (2001) put it: ‘The diﬀerence in the loan
availability between a concentrated market and a competitive market should
be more pronounced for not-so-young ﬁrms than for young ﬁrms.’ Our claim is
that the reason behind this puzzle is not that the cross-subsidization hypothesis
itself is wrong, but that the beneﬁts from relationship lending may not be
monotonously decreasing with more intense competition.
We assume pre-existing relationships between loan applicants and their
‘insider banks’2. There are two lock-in eﬀects in the model: First, insider
banks are assumed to possess an informational advantage. They receive a
‘noisy’ signal about the success probability of their pre-existing customers and
this information is not available to outsider banks.3 The second lock-in eﬀect
arises from the costs that the borrowers face should they switch to another
bank. Switching cost4 captures all the pecuniary and non-pecuniary expenses5
that are induced by the change of the supplier of ﬁnance. The magnitude of
the switching cost also measures the degree of monopoly power of the insider
bank. The model obeys a sequential structure: First, the borrower applies
ﬁnance from his insider bank. Secondly, after observing the noisy signal, the
insider bank decides whether to make an acceptable loan contract oﬀer or
not. Thirdly, if the borrower could not trade with his insider bank, he may
send loan applications to outsider banks and be ready to pay the switching
cost. Finally, before placing their bids, the outsider banks can observe that
1This argument is basically the same as the Schumpeterian view on the dynamic eﬃciency
in R&D sector: some degree of monopoly power is needed in order for investments in highly
uncertain new technologies to have a positive net present value at the ex ante stage.
2Cf. Hausbanks in Germany.
3This assumption can be justiﬁed by the notion that only the insider bank is likely to
have access to any soft information that may generate private signals about the borrower’s
quality, whereas the outsider banks have to rely only on the hard information (like ﬁnancial
statements) which is common to everyone. Cole (1998) provide empirical evidence that
banking relationships tend to produce valuable private information about the prospects of
the customer.
4Kim et al (2003) estimate the relevance of switching costs in banking industry and
conclude that the magnitude of these costs can be signiﬁcant.
5These expenses may arise from inconvencies due to unfavorable physical location of
other banks, diﬀerentiation in ﬁnancial services etc.
7the application comes from a borrower outside their ‘captive markets’. This
observation eﬀectively reveals the fact that the borrower has been rejected by
his insider lender and thereby transmits useful information.
The analysis is focused on an equilibrium that features the sequential
moves postulated above.6,7 We will show that higher switching cost does
not necessarily increase the insider bank’s proﬁts and thereby beneﬁts from
relationship lending. This is because with low switching cost it is feasible
also for low quality borrowers to switch banks. Threat of adverse selection
then curtails price competition and discourages outsider banks to make too
aggressive bids. As a result, it is easier for the insider bank to attract favorably
signalling customers to stick to their existing host bank. The adverse selection
eﬀect gradually fades away as the magnitude of the switching cost increases.
That, in turn, enables the outsider banks to lower their bids and it is harder
for the insider bank to keep its customers. This logic holds until the switching
cost is so high that only good customers can aﬀord to go for alternative banks.
After that threshold, the loan rate available from outsider banks remains
constant and greater switching cost has an unambiguously positive eﬀect on
the mark-up the insider bank is able to charge. Provided that the insider
information generated by the pre-existing relationship is accurate enough, we
show that the insider bank actually makes highest proﬁts when the switching
cost is either very low or suﬃciently high. Thus there is a non-monotonous
and ‘V-shaped’ relationship between insider bank’s proﬁts and the magnitude
of the switching cost.
Even though our analysis is static and features no intertemporal trade oﬀs,
the ‘dynamic implication’ of the model is a straight forward application of the
Petersen-Rajan argument. According to the cross-subsidization hypothesis,
higher expected proﬁts from relationship based lending should create greater
incentive for more extensive relationship formation. Therefore the V-shaped
pattern implies that relationship formation should be most frequent under
the extreme market structures; ie when the degree of insider bank’s monopoly
power (the switching cost) is very low or when it is suﬃciently high.8 This
prediction is supported by the recent empirical evidence in Elsas (2005),
who analyses the frequency of relationship lending in Germany. He reports
that the likelihood of having a ‘Hausbank relationship’ decreases as bank
concentration in local debt markets increases. This relationship holds for
low and intermediate levels of concentration, whereas in highly concentrated
6This practice facilitates tractability since the sequential moves game is analytically
simpler than a model where the informed ‘insider’ and uninformed ‘outsiders’ place bids
simultaneously. Auctions with interdependent values and asymmetrically informed bidders
do not feature bidding behavior in pure strategies (cf. von Thadden, 2004, and Krishna,
2002 ch. 8), which easily complicates the analysis.
7The sequential structure is plausible especially if one thinks that a strictly positive
fraction of the switching cost has to be paid already at the time of applying loans from
outsider banks, for instance, due to application costs and the eﬀort needed to locate suitable
replacement lenders.
8A similar justiﬁcation for a static model in relationship lending context is used for
instance by Cao and Shi (2001).
8markets less competition seems to stimulate relationship formation.9 As far
as greater switching cost can be interpreted as a proxy for higher market
concentration, the empirical results by Elsas (2005) coincide with the V-shaped
pattern derived in our theoretical model. The same pattern arises also in the
empirical part of Petersen and Rajan (1995, Table II, p. 423), in which there
is a clear tendency for a V-shaped relationship between market concentration
and credit availability for ﬁrms older than ﬁve years. Our model also provides
a potential explanation why such a non-monotonous relationship does not
emerge in the category of very young ﬁrms. It seems plausible that markets,
including the insider lender, are likely to know almost nothing about very
young ﬁrm’s future success probability. We show in the supplementary section
of the model that if the informational advantage of the insider bank is not
substantial, then insider bank’s proﬁts are low in the competitive limit and no
clear-cut V-shaped pattern arises.
A somewhat comparable result to ours is derived by Cao and Shi (2001),
who elaborate the ‘winner’s curse’ problem in a static auction theoretic
model. They abstract from any informational asymmetry between bidders and
postulate that all bidders may obtain ‘noisy’ information about the project
by exerting costly project evaluation. As the number of competing banks
increases, the threat of winner’s curse becomes more immediate because the
winner must have beaten a higher number of bids and the possible mistake
in project evaluation is likely to have been larger. Banks respond to this by
cutting the acquisition of costly information and participate in bidding contests
less frequently. Cao and Shi then show that an increase in the number of
potential bidders may sometimes reduce the number of banks that actively
compete for the project and the expected loan rate rises. As a result, more
intense competition can, under certain conditions, lead to higher proﬁts and
thereby more active relationship formation. In contrast to the Cao-Shi model,
our results are driven by the insider bank’s informational advantage and the
degree of competition is measured by the level of the switching cost rather
than by the explicit number of competing bidders.
There are also other models, eg Broecker (1990), Sharpe (1990)10,
Nakamura (1993) and Riordan (1993), that identify winner’s curse type
distortions of competition. These papers, however, are focused on studying
the relationship between adverse selection problem and banking competition
rather than the eﬀect of competition on relationship formation. The broad
outcome of these models is that the likelihood of a poor applicant getting
ﬁnance increases as the number of banks operating in the market is higher, so
that competition is likely to worsen adverse selection. This result is in line with
our ﬁnding that bad loan applicants are the more likely to approach outsider
banks and thereby get ﬁnance the lower is the switching cost. However, if the
model is extended to allow for costly information acquisition, the ‘V-shaped’
proﬁt function indicates that the marginal beneﬁt from more accurate private
information is higher under the extreme levels of the switching cost than under
9Also Kim et al (2004) ﬁnd some evidence in their Norwegian data that banks tend to
make more valuable relationship-loans in a more competitive market.
10von Thadden (2004) points out an error in Sharpe’s analysis and presents a correct way
to solve his model.
9intermediate switching cost. Hence, more eﬃcient information acquisition can
potentially counterbalance the eﬃciency losses due to the adverse selection
problem in competitive credit markets.
Other related papers include Greenbaum et al (1989), who examine loan
rate oﬀers by an ‘incumbent’ bank when borrowers have option to quit and start
searching for competitive oﬀers at a ﬁxed search cost. Their focus is, however,
on studying the expected remaining duration of the lender-client relationship,
and how it depends on the existing length of the relationship. The current
study is also related to horizontal diﬀerentiation models to the extent that
the switching cost can be interpreted to reﬂect the degree of diﬀerentiation.
Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) study how diﬀerentiation aﬀects the
screening intensity of loan applicants. They ﬁnd that a higher degree of
diﬀerentiation (less competition) is likely to lead to less intensive screening
and higher welfare. Hauswald and Marquez (2004) investigate the eﬀect of
competition on strategic information acquisition in credit markets. They
conclude that increasing competition will eventually induce banks to weight
lending in their ‘captive’ market segments (=relationship based lending)
instead of so called ‘transaction-lending’ in more competitive market segments.
A similar ‘ﬂight to captivity’ pattern is also reported by Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2004). Also Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that banks may
try to escape ﬁercer competition by substituting transactional lending with
relationship lending.
The paper is organized as follows. The main analysis is carried out
in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the ‘dynamic implication’ of the static
model according to the Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) cross-subsidization
hypothesis. Section 4 provides some remarks on the relationship between
banking competition and the adverse selection problem. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section, we construct a static model with one-time lending decision. The
model is particularly well suited to bank lending to SMEs who typically do not
have access to multiple sources of external ﬁnance.11 We assume pre-existing
customer relationship between a loan applicant and its insider bank. This
relationship generates ‘soft information’ about the quality of the loan applicant
that is not observable to outsider banks. If the loan applicant cannot trade with
its insider bank, he may break up the existing relationship, send applications
to outsider banks and arrange a bidding game between them. The option to
switch banks, however, incurs a cost, c. The switching cost describes both
the ex ante expenses incurred by the search for suitable replacement lenders,
as well as the various costs arising ex post from the frictions related to the
11According to Financial Inquiry by Bank of Finland, Ministry of
Trade and Industry and EK (the report in ﬁnnish can be found at
http://www.bof.ﬁ/ﬁn/3_rahoitusmarkkinat/3.6_Raportit/RahKysely2004.pdf) most
of the small ﬁrms in industry and service sector have a customer relationship with only one
bank.
10change in the supplier of ﬁnancial services. The magnitude of the switching
cost c serves as an index for insider bank’s monopoly power. We assume that
there are at least two outsider banks available at this one-time switching cost
expense.12
In our static world, it is assumed that there are no beneﬁts from relationship
building after the current ﬁnancing stage; ie the outsider banks in the bidding
game will not have the option of becoming insider lenders in the future.
This assumption can be made without loss of generality, because loan price
oﬀers at any interim stage would anyhow depend on the ultimate realization
of relationship beneﬁts. The cross-subsidization hypothesis implies that the
higher the expected future rents are the greater is the incentive to undercut
loan rates at the earlier stages. Therefore we may focus on the ﬁnal stage and
derive a relationship between the switching cost and insider banks’ ability to
make proﬁts. Once we have that relationship, the Petersen-Rajan argument
can be used to discuss the availability of credit at the earlier stages under
diﬀerent levels of the switching cost.13
2.1 Players and information
Loan applicants have heterogeneous type θ ∈ Θ={G,B}.I t i s c o m m o n
knowledge that a fraction φ of the borrowers are low risk (G), while the
complementary fraction 1 − φ are high risk (B). G stands for ‘good loan
applicant’ and B f o r‘ b a dl o a na p p l i c a n t ’ . B o t ht y p e sh a v ea c c e s st oa n
investment opportunity, the implementation of which requires external ﬁnance
equal to k =1 . Banks, in turn, have unlimited access to frictionless ﬁnancial
markets where they can borrow and lend at the rate ¯ R. Both banks and loan
applicants are risk neutral. A high (low) risk borrower succeeds in his project
with probability πB (πG) and fails with probability 1−πB (1−πG). If successful,
the value of the output generated by either a high or a low risk project is q.I f
a project fails, it produces nothing. Since we assume that πG >π B, a low risk
loan applicant is better than a high risk borrower in terms of the ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance. Moreover, it is assumed that πGq>¯ R>π Bq,w h i c h
means that it is eﬃcient to ﬁnance good borrowers but not the bad ones. The
average success probability is denoted by ¯ π ≡ πGφ + πB (1 − φ).W ea s s u m e
that ¯ πq > ¯ R, so that it is ex ante eﬃcient to grant a loan.
Each loan applicant has a pre-existing customer relationship to the most
preferred bank, the insider bank. The insider lender has access to ‘soft ’or
‘tacit’ information14 that is not available to other banks. This information
12This assumption simply guarantees that the borrower can arrange a competitive bidding
game at the cost c.
13A truly dynamic model is needed if, for instance, one wants to analyze how the evolution
of private information during the lending relationship aﬀects the duration of the relationship
or client’s incentive to seek alternative ﬁnanciers (cf. Greenbaum et al,1989). However,
empirical studies by Elsas (2005) and Cole (1998) indicate that the lenght of the relationship
seems rather unimportant in terms of available relationship beneﬁts.
14We note that ‘soft information’ is assumed to be non-veriﬁable in nature, so that the
insider bank cannot gain by reselling it. The casual observation that banks do not typically
outsource the screening of SMEs lends support to this view.
11serves as a signal, s ∈ S = {b,g}, about the quality of the borrower’s current
project. However, the signal is ‘noisy’ in the sense that it reveals the borrower’s
true type only with certain probability. Formally,
Pr(g | G)=pg, Pr(g | B)=1− pg,
Pr(b | B)=pb, Pr(b | G)=1− pb.
We assume that the signal is equally accurate in both cases; ie, pg = pb ≡ p.






banks only know the common prior; ie the distribution Φ={φ,1 − φ} over
the set Θ. A fraction λ = pφ +( 1− p)(1− φ) of the loan applicants sends a
signal g. Correspondingly, a fraction 1 − λ = p(1 − φ)+( 1− p)φ as i g n a lb.








where ξg (ξb) is the probability of a project being good (bad) given a signal









q>¯ R and (ξbπB +( 1− ξb)πG)q<¯ R. (2.2)
According to (2.2),t h en u m b e ro fG-types erroneously identiﬁed with signal b
is suﬃciently low in order for the insider bank to be able to separate a pool of
‘bad customers’ among whom the average project has a negative net present
value; ie it is eﬃcient to ﬁnance projects with signal s = g but not with s = b.
In the Appendix we analyze the opposite case, where the signal s is ‘idle’ in
the sense that so many G-types become erroneously identiﬁed with signal b
that even in the pool of borrowers with signal b the average project has a
non-negative net present value.
2.2 Sequence of moves
We now postulate the following sequential structure.
Stage 1:
A borrower ﬁrst applies loan from the insider bank and sends a signal s
transmitting information about his type. The signal is correct with probability
p.
Stage 2:
Based on the signal s ∈ S = {b,g}, the insider bank either proposes a loan
rate oﬀer Rs
I to the loan applicant in a take-it-or-leave-it manner or rejects the
applicant and refuses to make any oﬀers.
15Note that a signal p − x is equally valuable as the signal p + x. In the extreem case,
if p =0 , then the insider bank knows that the signal is wrong for sure, which is as good
information as having p =1 . The assumption that p>1
2 merely indicates that the signal is
strictly better than just a ﬂip of a coin.
12Stage 3:
A borrower who could not trade with the insider bank may send applications to
other banks, arrange a bidding game and be ready to switch banks. This option
incurs a ﬁxed switching cost, c. A strictly positive fraction of the switching
cost is realized already at the time of applying loans form outsider banks.16 If
the switching option does not seem economically feasible, the borrower simply
leaves the investment opportunity and drops out from the credit market.
Stage 4:
In a bidding game, the outsider banks place bids according to the updated,
posterior beliefs about the quality of the project. By Bertrand argument, the




µπG +( 1− µ)πB
, (2.3)
where µ is the posterior probability that the loan applicant is of type G.
Regarding the insider bank’s loan rate oﬀer Rs
I at stage 2, we have the
following lemmas:
Lemma 2.1 If the insider bank chooses to propose a loan rate oﬀer, it will




Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.2 The insider bank’s loan rate oﬀer is given by





Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus the insider bank’s action set can be deﬁned as Ω={y,n},w h e r ey
stands for ’yes, the insider bank is willing to trade at rate RI’, while n stands
for ‘no trading’. A strategy proﬁle of an insider bank prescribes conditional
probabilities  = {fb,f g} over action ’y’i nt h es e tΩ;i efb (fg) is the
probability that the insider bank proposes a loan rate oﬀer RI having observed
s = b (s = g). Given the strategy proﬁle, insider bank’s proﬁts are given by










RI− ¯ R and vb =( ξbπB +( 1− ξb)πG)RI− ¯ R, (2.5)
are the expected proﬁts available from trading with borrowers who signal s = g
and s = b respectively.
16These ex ante switching expenses can be thought to result from the eﬀort of locating
suitable replacement lenders and the cost of writing new applications. This assumption is
















































































Figure 1: Sequence of moves
At stage 3, rejected borrowers decide whether to organize a bidding game
or drop out. Their decision is driven by the following individual rationality
constraints:
πB (q − R
∗) − c ≥ 0, (IRr
B)
πG (q − R
∗) − c ≥ 0. (IRr
G)
The probability that a loan applicant of type i stays in the market and applies
loan from outsider banks is denoted by γi, i = B,G. The pair Γ={γB,γG}
prescribes the ‘participation proﬁle’ of rejected loan applicants at stage 3. If
IRr
i holds with strict inequality, then the borrower of type i stays in the market
and arranges a bidding game with probability one; ie γi =1 .I fI R r
i holds with
equality, the probability of participation is then given by γi ∈ [0,1].I f I R r
i
is not satisﬁed, then γi =0 .N o t et h a tI R r
B is stricter than IRr
G, so that the
B-types drop out from the market more easily than the G-types.
If a bidding game takes place, at stage 4, the competing bidders infer that
1) the insider bank has not made an acceptable oﬀer to the particular loan
applicant (informational spillover) and that 2) at least one of the individual
rationality constraints, IRr
B or IRr
G, holds. Hence, the posterior probability µ
that the loan applicant is of type G is obtained by using Bayes’ rule, given the
insider bank’s equilibrium strategies  = {fb,f g} and borrowers’ willingness
to stay in the market Γ={γB,γG}.
Figure 1 illustrates the model’s sequential structure and possible actions of
each player.
142.3 Equilibrium analysis
Deﬁnition 2.3 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is the insider bank’s






, rejected loan applicants participation proﬁle
Γ∗ = {γ∗
B,γ∗
G}, outsider banks’ posterior belief µ∗, and the loan rates R∗(µ∗)
and RI such that (i)

∗ ∈ arg max
fb∈[0,1],fg∈[0,1]










i ∈ [0,1],i fπi(q − R
∗) − c =0 ,
γ
∗
i =0 ,i fπi (q − R
∗) − c<0.
(iii) the equilibrium posterior beliefs are obtained by Bayes’ rule, when
applicable, and (iv) the loan rates R∗(µ∗) and RI are determined by (2.3)
and (2.4) respectively.
Proposition 2.4 A PBE deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 that features the sequential
structure described in Section 2.2 exists.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Usually a model with sequential moves is solved by backward induction starting
from the ﬁnal stage of the game. This time, however, it is convenient to start
with a result concerning the insider bank’s optimal strategies at stage 2. After
that we jump to the stage 4 and proceed backwards.
Lemma 2.5 Given the assumption of ‘informative’ signals in (2.2),i n s i d e r







Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Thus the insider bank proposes loan contract oﬀers only to those applicants
sending a signal s = g, and rejects applicants identiﬁed with s = b. At stage
4, outsider banks’ posterior belief µ depends on the insider bank’s optimal






= {0,1},a n d
rejected loan applicants’ participation proﬁle Γ={γB,γG}. By Bayes’ rule,
we obtain




γG (1 − p)φ
γG (1 − p)φ + γBp(1 − φ)
. (2.6)
15Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The lowest bid in a bidding game, the competitive loan rate R∗(µ∗),i s
then determined by (2.3). At stage 3, rejected borrowers decide upon their
continuation in the loan market. Given R∗(µ∗) and assumption (2.2),i ti s
easy to see that full participation is not feasible. If Γ={γB,γG} = {1,1},









G is satisﬁed; ie full participation cannot be an
equilibrium participation proﬁle Γ∗.S i n c eI R r
B is stricter than IRr
G,t h eB-types
drop out from the market more easily than the G-types. Our next candidate
for equilibrium participation proﬁle is Γ={0,1};i ea l lt h eB-types drop
out while the G-types stay in the market. Given Γ={0,1},µ ∗ =1and
R∗(µ∗)=¯ R/πG. Γ={0,1} is consistent with the equilibrium beliefs and the
equilibrium competitive loan rate only if IRr
G is satisﬁed while IRr
B is not. This




) <c≤ πGq − ¯ R.
We deﬁne
c1 ≡ πB(q −
¯ R
πG
) and c2 ≡ πGq − ¯ R. (2.7)
Given ∗ = {0,1}, µ∗ and R∗(µ∗), Γ∗ = {0,1} is the equilibrium participation
proﬁle if the switching cost satisﬁes c ∈ (c1,c 2]. If c>c 2, the cost of switching
banks is so high that even the G-types prefer quitting to arranging a bidding
contest; ie Γ∗ = {0,0} for c>c 2.
If c ∈ (0,c 1],t h eI R r
B has to be binding, ie the B-types are indiﬀerent
between applying loans from outsider banks and dropping out. Then the
participation proﬁle is given by Γ={γB,1} where γB ∈ (0,1).I R r
B holding
with equality implies that the equilibrium competitive loan rate satisﬁes
R
∗(µ
∗)=q − c/πB. (2.8)
A bid slightly above this oﬀer cannot be an equilibrium competitive loan rate
because then only the G-types would participate and some bidder could gain
by undercutting the loan rate oﬀer. However, the equilibrium competitive
loan rate cannot be any lower either because then IRr
B w o u l dh o l dw i t hs t r i c t
inequality, so that all the B-types would participate and the winning bidder
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≡ ˜ µ(c). (2.9)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium loan rates
Finally, the equilibrium loan rate oﬀer by the insider bank at stage 2 is given
by (2.4).
In summary,






such that ∗ = {0,1}∀ c and ∀c ∈ [0,c 1]
Γ
∗ = {˜ γ(c),1},µ
∗ =˜ µ(c), R
∗ = q −
c
πB




∀c ∈ (c1,c 2]
Γ
∗ = {0,1},µ





¯ R + c
πG
.
For c>c 2, Γ∗ = {0,0} so that no bidding games take place and
RI = q.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium loan rates RI and R∗ as functions of the
switching cost, which is also our index for insider bank’s monopoly power.
When the market is competitive, ie c is relatively low, the lowest loan rate at
the bidding game has to be quite high in order to induce a suﬃcient number of
B-types to drop out. In a sense, threat of adverse selection curtails price
competition when the switching cost is low. The adverse selection eﬀect,
17however, gradually fades away as the magnitude of the switching cost increases
since ever greater fraction of the B-types drop out from the market. As a result,
the competitive loan rate decreases. This logic continues until the threshold c1
is reached. For c>c 1, the bidders know that all the remaining loan applicants
have to be G-types, so that the equilibrium competitive loan rate is given by
the constant R∗ = ¯ R/πG. If the switching cost is very high, ie c>c 2,e v e n
the G-types choose to quit the market and no bidding games take place. Even
though larger c increases the insider bank’s mark-up, c/πB, it nevertheless
decreases the highest possible loan rate RI due to the reduction in R∗.T h i s
holds until c = c1,a f t e rw h i c hR∗ remains constant and greater switching cost
only contributes to the insider bank’s mark-up. When c>c 2, there is no
outside option available for the loan applicant and the insider bank can charge
RI = q and keep all the surplus.
Note that insider bank’s proﬁts follow a similar pattern as the loan rate
RI with respect to c. Hence, insider bank’s proﬁts are a non-monotonous and
‘V-shaped’ function of the switching cost. Insider banks thus make highest
proﬁts under the extreme market structures; ie when the switching cots is
very low or when it is suﬃciently high.
3 The ‘dynamic implication’ of the model
In this section we will analyze the implication of our static model on insider
bank’s incentive to form new lending relationships. Petersen and Rajan argue
that the greater is the insider bank’s ability to extract surpluses at the later
stages of the relationship the stronger is the bank’s incentive to extend credit to
new customers. Since they assume that greater market concentration implies
higher proﬁts, Petersen and Rajan conclude that relationship formation should
be more extensive under concentrated than competitive market structures.
However, based on their own empirical evidence, this logic seems to work only
in the case of very young ﬁrms; ie with ﬁrms younger than four years. As noted
by Cao and Shi (2001), it is surprising that the cross-subsidization does not
emerge in the category of ﬁrms that are neither very young nor old, since these
ﬁrms typically possess strong growth potential but whose survivorship is not
that uncertain any more. Our study provides a theoretical explanation for this
anomaly. We use the magnitude of the switching cost to measure the monopoly
power of a relationship lender. We ﬁnd that the beneﬁts from relationship
lending (insider bank’s proﬁts) are a non-monotonous and V-shaped function
of this index. The recent empirical evidence in Elsas (2005) supports the
V-shaped pattern. Elsas reports that the likelihood of having a ‘Hausbank
relationship’ decreases as bank concentration in local debt markets increases.
Also Table II in Petersen and Rajan’s (1995, p. 423) own study indicates a
tendency for a V-shaped relationship between insider bank’s market power and
the availability of credit for ﬁrms older than ﬁve years.
One might wonder why the V-shaped pattern does not emerge in the
category of very young ﬁrms. A potential explanation for this is that there
might not be very accurate private information available about the future
18survivorship of young start-ups. In the Appendix B we elaborate the case
where the informational advantage of the insider bank is not very signiﬁcant.
We ﬁnd that in the case of ‘idle signals’ relationship beneﬁts tend to be low
under competitive markets. Hence, the accuracy of the private information
is an essential element in the building of the customer lock-in. In accordance
with Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) reasoning, lowering proﬁts, in turn, reduce
credit availability at the early stages of the lending. Moreover, in Petersen and
Rajan’s (1995) data, the relationship between the prevalence of institutional
debt and market concentration seems to exhibit an ‘inverted V-shape’ in the
category of relatively old (over 32 years) ﬁrms; ie ﬁrms with institutional
debt are more frequent under intermediate market structures than under
competitive or concentrated markets. This observation could be explained by
the plausible assumption that mature ﬁrms are less dependent on bank debt
than younger ﬁrms; ie they may have easier access to arms’ length ﬁnance or
ﬁnancial markets.17 In other words, older ﬁrms have a wider array of outside
options than the young ﬁrms. The more a bank tries to extract surpluses
from the ﬁrm the greater is the likelihood that the ﬁrm rather resorts to
some alternative sources of ﬁnance. Therefore the V-shaped proﬁt function
of the insider bank can be consistent with the inverted V-shaped pattern of
the prevalence of bank debt among mature ﬁrms.
4 Adverse selection and competition
The measure for adverse selection in our model consists of two components:
Firstly, some of the B-types are erroneously identiﬁed with signal g and





=( 1− p)(1− φ). Secondly, for c ≤ c1, some of the initially rejected
B-types can seek ﬁnance via bidding games. The equilibrium measure for this
category is ˜ γ(c) given in (2.10). Combining these two components gives us the
overall measure for adverse selection as a function of the switching cost (see
Figure 3):
A(c)=( 1− p)(1− φ)+˜ γ(c).
Obviously, adverse selection is more common when market the switching cost
is low than when it is high. The second channel of adverse selection (some of
the B-types get ﬁnance via bidding games) is decreasing in c and eventually
vanishes completely for c>c 1,b e c a u s ea l lt h eB-types rather drop out than
pay the switching cost. What remains is the ﬁrst channel; ie some of the
B-types are erroneously identiﬁed as good borrowers and get ﬁnance from the
insider bank. Note that the probability of adverse selection through the ﬁrst
channel is (1 − p)(1− φ), which is the smaller the greater is the accuracy of
the signal (the larger is p). Moreover, since no bidding games will take place
for c>c 2,t h o s eG-type customers who were erroneously identiﬁed as bad loan
applicants by the insider bank will not get ﬁnance at all. Hence, there will
17Rajan (1992) argues that ﬁrms use arm’s length ﬁnance in order to limit bank’s









Figure 3: Extent of adverse selection
be credit rationing in the sense that not all the viable projects get ﬁnance.
The measure for credit rationing under very concentrated market structures
(c>c 2)i sg i v e nb y(1 − λ)(1− ξb)=( 1− p)φ.
Our model thus produces new aspects to the discussion about the
relationship between banking competition and the eﬃciency of resource
allocation. Broecker (1990), Nakamura (1993) and Riordan (1993) — who
study how competition in credit markets aﬀects the adverse selection problem
— identify a winner’s curse type distortions of competition. If banks’ project
evaluation technologies are imperfectly correlated and if lenders cannot observe
whether a loan applicant has already been rejected elsewhere, the likelihood
that a poor applicant gets ﬁnance increases as the number of banks operating
in the market is higher. As a result, competition is likely to worsen adverse
selection and damage the eﬃciency of resource allocation. Our model with
insider information and switching cost supports this view in the sense that
adverse selection problem is most prevalent under competitive markets. On
the other hand, we conclude that the allocation of ﬁnancial resources is most
eﬃcient under some intermediate level of competition. This is because the
extent of adverse selection remains constant for c>c 1, but further increase
in the switching cost, ie c>c 2, gives rise to another source of ineﬃciency,
namely excess credit rationing. However, if one thinks that the insider bank
can invest in information acquisition, the ‘V-shaped’ proﬁt function indicates
the marginal beneﬁt from more accurate private information is higher under
the extreme levels of the switching cost than under the intermediate degrees of
competition. More eﬃcient information acquisition could thus counterbalance
the eﬃciency losses due to adverse selection in competitive credit markets.
205 Conclusions
We construct a model on relationship lending where the cost of switching
banks measures the degree of competition in the credit market. Besides the
switching cost, customer lock-in is essentially driven by relationship lender’s
informational advantage compared to outsider lenders. We show that higher
switching cost, which can be thought to reﬂect greater concentration in local
credit markets, does not necessarily lead to higher equilibrium proﬁts in
relationship lending. Adverse selection problem curtails price competition
when the switching cost is low by discouraging outsider banks to make too
aggressive bids. Threat of adverse selection gradually fades away as the cost
of switching banks increases, which de facto reduces insider bank’s proﬁts.
However, lack of competition starts to dominate for suﬃciently high levels of
switching cost, so that insider bank’s proﬁts become increasing in this cost.
We thereby document a ‘V-shaped’ relationship between insider bank’s proﬁts
and the switching cost. The ‘dynamic implication’ of this pattern is that
relationship formation should be most frequent under the extreme market
structures; ie when the switching cost is very low or when it is suﬃciently
high.
Our ﬁnding runs counter to the Petersen-Rajan (1995) argument that
competition is generally detrimental to relationship lending. The V-shaped
pattern, however, is supported by recent empirical evidence in Elsas (2005)
and, to some extent, in Kim et al. (2004). A clear tendency for a V-shaped
relationship between availability of institutional debt and relationship lender’s
market power also arises in the empirical part of Petersen and Rajan’s
(1995) own study. This is the case especially in the category of ﬁrms older
than ﬁve years. The reason why the similar tendency does not emerge in
start-up ﬁnancing is probably because insider lender’s informational advantage
is not very pronounced in that category. If the model is solved assuming
suﬃciently inaccurate private information by the insider lender (the case of
idle signals’ is analyzed in the Appendix B), inﬁnitesimal switching cost (=
intense competition) is shown to lead to low proﬁts and no clear-cut V-shaped
relationship arises.
We also ﬁnd that allocation of ﬁnancial resources is most eﬃcient under
intermediate market structures: low switching cost tends to augment adverse
selection problem, while some of the ‘good’ loan applicants are left without
ﬁnance when the cost of switching banks is suﬃciently high. However, if insider
banks can invest in the accuracy of private information, the incentive to acquire
information is stronger when the expected beneﬁts from relationship lending
are higher. Therefore more eﬃcient information acquisition can potentially
counterbalance the ineﬃciencies in resource allocation when the switching cost
is either very low or high.
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A. Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Since πGq>¯ R>π Bq , the insider bank wants to make sure that
at least the G-types are willing to trade at the proposed loan rate oﬀer. If this
was not the case and the oﬀer attracted only the B-types to trade, the insider
bank would make losses. Thus, if the insider bank chooses to propose an oﬀer,
it is the highest possible loan rate that still induces at least the G-types to
trade — regardless of the signal.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. The borrower is willing to trade with the insider bank only if the
oﬀer gives him at least as much utility as applying loans from outsider banks,
arranging a bidding game and ultimately switching customership. Hence, the
following bunch of individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints has to be satisﬁed:
πB (q − RI) ≥ 0, (IRB)
πG (q − RI) ≥ 0, (IRG)
πB (q − RI) ≥ πB (q − R
∗) − c, (ICB)
πG (q − RI) ≥ πG (q − R
∗) − c. (ICG)
Both IRB and IRG are equally binding; ie RI ≤ q,b u tI C G is stricter than
ICB, implying that it is more diﬃcult for the insider bank to induce the G-type
to trade; ie, a loan contract oﬀer that is accepted by the G-type will also be
accepted by the B-type. Hence the relevant constraints restricting the insider
bank’s pricing strategy are IRG (=IRB)a n dI C G.S i n c e V is linear in the
proposed loan rate, the insider bank wants to set as high RI as possible. Hence
the insider bank’s loan rate oﬀer is the minimum of RIst h a tm a k eI R G and
ICG binding; ie RI =m i n {q, c
πG + R∗}.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Under the sequential practice, a G-type can trade with the insider
bank with probability p and is left with the option to arrange a bidding
game with probability 1 − p. A deviation would mean sending applications
immediately also to outsider banks. Given the equilibrium loan rates RI and
R∗(µ∗), trading with the insider bank produces a G-type the same utility
level that is available from arranging a bidding game, trading with an outsider
bank and paying the switching cost. Hence, a G-type is indiﬀerent between
obeying the sequential structure and deviating. Therefore we may say that
no G-type will ever deviate. On the other hand, a B-type strictly prefers
the sequential practice to deviation because it involves a chance of being
erroneously identiﬁed as a G-type. Hence, there is no point for the B-type
to pay the part of the switching cost that is realized immediately before it is
24clear that he cannot trade with the insider bank. Regarding the behaviour
of insider banks, we note that they must prefer sequential structure because
that guarantees them a ’mark-up’ c/πG with probability one. Moreover, a
deviation where the insider bank rejects the loan applicant but participates in
the bidding game is trivial because at that point all the bidders are anyhow
equally well informed thanks to the informational spillover arising from the
initial rejection of the loan applicant.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.5
Proof. Since by limited liability RI ≤ q, trading with borrowers sending
as i g n a ls = b incurs losses. Therefore it would be rational to trade with those
loan applicants only if such practice somehow increased the proﬁts available
from trading with those who signal s = g.T h i sw o u l dh a p pe ni fc h oo s i n gf∗
b > 0
aﬀected the outsider banks beliefs in such a way that R∗(µ∗) would increase,
so that the insider bank could also charge a higher RI. However, if f∗
g =1 ,
choosing f∗
b > 0 would not aﬀect the posterior beliefs at all. If f∗
g ∈ (0,1),
then f∗
b > 0 would reduce the fraction of ’bad customers’ among the rejected
loan applicants, so that the posterior µ∗ would be higher. Since R∗ (µ∗) < 0,
choosing f∗
b > 0 would unambiguously reduce the proﬁts avaialble form trading
with borrowers who signal s = g. The trivial case f∗
g =0and f∗
b > 0 is not
feasible, since there would be not positive proﬁts counterbalancing the losses
incurred by trading with borrowers signalling s = b. Therefore we must have
f∗
b =0 .
Refraining from ﬁnancing some loan applicants who signal s = g would not
make sense either because that practice would only improve the average quality
of rejected applicants. As a result, the posterior µ∗ would again be higher and
the insider bank’s proﬁts lower. Thus it is optimal to choose f∗
g =1 .
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2.6







the total measure for rejected loan applicants is 1 − λ = p(1 − φ)+( 1− p)φ,
which equals the measure for borrowers who send a signal b. The fraction of
B-a n dG-types among the rejected loan applicants are ξb (1 − λ)=p(1 − φ)
and (1 − ξb)(1− λ)=( 1− p)φ respectively. Given the participation proﬁle
Γ={γB,γG}, the total measure of rejected loan applicants who stay in the
market is γBp(1 − φ)+γG (1 − p)φ. Bayes’ rule then produces the formula in
(2.6).










Figure 4: Equilibrium loan rates with ‘idle’ signals
B. Equilibrium with ‘idle’ signals
Signals being ‘idle’ means that so many G-types become erroneously identiﬁed
with signal b that even in the pool of borrowers with signal b the average








q>¯ R and (ξbπB +( 1− ξb)πG)q ≥ ¯ R. (5.1)
This fact implies that trading with any borrower would generate non-negative
proﬁts to the insider bank. Thus, in principle, the insider bank would gain
by extending credit to any loan applicant, regardless of the signal. But if
the equilibrium strategies were fg = fb =1 , then Bayes’ rule would have no
bite because bidding games would become a ‘zero-probability event’ and the
posterior beliefs could be any distribution over the set Θ.
Unique beliefs can, however, be obtained by the following reasoning.
Firstly, the insider bank knows that the more the posterior distribution weights
low-quality borrowers (ie the lower is µ) the easier it is to induce the G-types
to accept the proposed oﬀer. This objective is reached if all rejected loan
applicants are those identiﬁed with signal b.T h u s w e h a v e f∗
g =1 , but
f∗
b ∈ [0,1). The fact that trading with a borrower who sends a signal g
produces higher proﬁts than trading with a borrower who sends a signals b
also supports this strategy. Secondly, since trading also with borrowers sending
signal b makes proﬁts, the insider bank wants to set f∗







= {1 − ε,1} where ε is a strictly positive but inﬁnitesimal
number. Hence, given the optimal strategies ∗ = {1 − ε,1},t h ep o s t e r i o r
beliefs are updated according to (2.6) and the competitive loan rate R∗(µ∗) is
then determined by (2.3).
26Equilibrium with ‘idle’ signals diﬀers from the case of ‘informative’ signals
in only one respect: Full participation among the rejected loan applicants, ie
Γ={1,1}, is now feasible for suﬃciently low levels of market concentration.
Γ∗ = {1,1} implies µ∗ =1− ξb and R∗ = ¯ R/[(1 − ξb)πG + ξbπB] <q ,w h i c h
are consistent with IRr
B holding with strict inequality if
c<π B(q −
¯ R
(1 − ξb)πG + ξbπB
) ≡ c0.
Otherwise, for c ≥ c0, Γ∗, µ∗, R∗ and RI, are determined by the same rules as
in the case of ‘informative’ signals within the intervals c ∈ [c0,c 1], c ∈ (c1,c 2]
and c ∈ [c2,∞).
Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium loan rates RI and R∗ as functions of c.T h e
loan rate function RI now features, as well as the proﬁt function would, ‘double
kinks’. When c<c 0, all rejected loan applicants stay in the market and the
average quality of projects seeking ﬁnance via bidding games is constant and
greater search cost only contributes to the insider bank’s mark-up. However,
for c ≥ c0, an ever increasing number of B-types start dropping out from the
credit market and competing bidders are able to make more aggressive bids.
As a result, also the insider bank needs to cut its loan rates as the switching
cost increases. Hence, we have the ﬁrst ‘kink’ at c = c0. The second ‘kink’
at c = c1 is due to the same reason as in the case of informative signals: For
c ≥ c1, all the bad customers have dropped out, R∗ remains constant and
greater switching cost again only boosts the insider bank’s mark-up.
Note that under ‘idle’ signals the extent of adverse selection in the credit
market does not depend on market concentration. Since f∗
b =1− ε such
that ε → 0, practically every loan applicant — irrespective of the signal — gets
ﬁnance from the insider lender. As a result, the measure for adverse selection
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